

5/29/53 at

25X1A

26 May 1953

*Handwritten signature*

TO : Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Reaction to Recent Pravda Article

My reaction to the recent (second) Pravda article on Foreign Affairs is simply this:

1. The article reflects both a lively hope and a lively apprehension on the part of the Soviet leaders: -- a hope for an exacerbation of differences between the United States and its Western allies, an apprehension lest this process of deterioration in relations among the Western powers, which is pleasing to the Soviets, be interrupted and reversed by the Bermuda meeting. The Soviet leaders would like very much to have high-level talks with the British and ourselves at a time when their relations with us are seriously disturbed. Their hopes for bettering their position to any important extent in negotiations with us -- their hopes, in fact, of reaching any agreement at all with the West -- are conditional on their ability to develop a split between ourselves and our allies.

12.  
British

2. The reference to Senator McCarthy is significant. Heretofore, they have ignored his existence. They now mention him not in connection with his activities in this country but only in connection with Anglo-American relations, and because they see in the use of his name a further means of stirring up differences and resentment between ourselves and the British.

3. I find it significant that the Pravda specifically indorses Churchill's thesis that we need not try to settle everything at one time but that it would be better to concentrate upon one or two key problems. This does seem to me to speak for a genuine desire on the Soviet's part to seek agreements with respect to Korea and Germany, possibly also Japan, that would involve less danger and uncertainty for themselves than the present state of affairs.

4. Their refusal of <sup>to meet</sup> bid on Austria, is I think, merely an expression of a more business-like and serious attitude on the part of the present leaders toward international negotiations than was present before. They

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

believe that we are well informed of the military and strategic reasons why they would not be inclined to conclude an Austrian peace treaty in advance of some clarification with respect to the German problem. Believing this, they assume that our desire for a resumption of Austrian treaty discussions is merely a propaganda maneuver designed to place them in an awkward position before the world public, and they are not having any of it.

GEORGE F. KENNAN